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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Society is forced to deal with the inevitable side effects of expan-
sion as it continues to grow. The continual increase in litigation is 
one of these side effects, and it has strained the resources of our judi-
cial system. Litigation is slow and expensive as court dockets become 
more crowded. This rise in litigation has led society to explore alter-
native means of dispute resolution. Today, Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution1 is a burgeoning field of study that encompasses many aspects 
of society.  
 Mediation is a popular form of ADR that has been used to settle 
disputes in courts, public agencies, and between private parties.2 
Mediation is “a process in which a mediator facilitates communica-
tion and negotiation between parties to assist them in reaching a 
voluntary agreement regarding their dispute.”3 The introduction of 
the mediator as a neutral third party is an integral part of the me-
diation process.4 In order for the mediation to have a chance at reach-
ing a settlement, there are generally two prerequisites: first, the par-
ties must have faith in the mediator’s neutrality and, second, they 
                                                                                                                    
 * J.D. Candidate May 2003, Florida State University College of Law; B.S., Political 
Science, Florida State University. I would like to dedicate this Comment to my wife, Erin, 
whose love and support has made all of this possible. I would like to acknowledge Chasity 
O’Steen and the rest of the Law Review staff for all of their help throughout the editing 
process. 
 1. Hereinafter “ADR.” 
 2. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Prefatory Note (2001); see also Mindy D. Rufenacht, Com-
ment, The Concern Over Confidentiality in Mediation—An In-Depth Look at the Protection 
Provided by the Proposed Uniform Mediation Act, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 113, 113 (“Support 
for mediation has increased dramatically over the last twenty years, and now there are 
more than 2000 federal and state statutes regulating the field.") (footnote omitted). 
 3. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 2(1) (2001). 
 4. Greg Dillard, The Future of Mediation Confidentiality in Texas: Shedding Light on 
a Murky Situation, 21 REV. LITIG. 137, 139 (2002).  
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must trust in the confidentiality of the process.5 As a fundamental 
element of the mediation process, confidentiality has been a hotly 
debated topic in the courts and among academia. This debate has 
centered more on the individual’s expectation of confidentiality and 
its importance to the mediation process than on the court’s interest 
in adjudicating all relevant evidence.6  
 States have differed in the scope and breadth of their use of me-
diation. Some states require mandatory mediation, while other states 
leave the decision to the parties.7 In addition, some states provide 
specific statutory enforcement to mediation agreements, but other 
states leave enforcement to the law of contracts.8 While most states 
have rules relating to mediation in their codes of civil procedure, oth-
ers choose to expand mediation rules statutorily.9 Confidentiality is 
another area in which states have varied greatly.  
 Part I of this Comment begins with a general review of confiden-
tiality in mediation. The prevailing norms in mediation today are 
discussed to show the importance of confidentiality in the process. 
Part II focuses on the recently approved Uniform Mediation Act 
(UMA)10 and its approach to confidentiality. The UMA is a collabora-
tion of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws, which promotes uniformity in mediation by applying a generic 
approach to topics that are covered in different ways by many 
states.11 This Section discusses the UMA’s approach to confidentiality 
and examines several portions of the Act that will have an effect on 
confidentiality. Part III briefly analyzes Florida’s current approach to 
confidentiality in mediation. Part IV presents the question of what 
benefit, if any, Florida can glean from the UMA. This Section focuses 
in particular on Florida Senate Bill 1226,12 which was approved 
unanimously by the Senate Judiciary and Finance Committees dur-
ing the 2002 legislative session. Senate Bill 1226, if enacted, will 
adopt some changes to mediation confidentiality that conform to the 
UMA.13  
                                                                                                                    
 5. Id. 
 6. See generally Charles W. Ehrhardt, Confidentiality, Privilege and Rule 408: The 
Protection of Mediation Proceedings in Federal Court, 60 LA. L. REV. 91, 102 (1999) (ex-
plaining that even the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence were concerned about an 
individual’s expectation of privacy). 
 7. See 1 SARAH R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE § 7.1, app. A, B 
(2d ed. 2001). 
 8. Id. § 8.1, app. A, B. 
 9. Id. § 8.1, app. A. 
 10. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT (2001). 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. Fla. CS for SB 1226 (2002).  
 13. See infra Part IV. 
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 After arguing that Senate Bill 1226 should ultimately be enacted, 
this discussion examines whether Florida should adopt the UMA ap-
proach, which grants a specific mediator privilege. This privilege pro-
tects the confidentiality of the process by giving the mediator the 
right to refuse to testify, and to prevent others from testifying, about 
mediation communications.14 This is an area of mediation law in 
which the states have varied greatly, and it is a major focus of the 
UMA. Ultimately, this Note argues that Florida should adopt the 
UMA approach of granting a limited mediator privilege. 
II.   CONFIDENTIALITY IN MEDIATION 
 Confidentiality in mediation refers to the ability of a party to keep 
the contents of the mediation from being used as evidence at a sub-
sequent legal proceeding.15 This is important, not just from a legal 
standpoint, but from a practical perspective. Candor by the parties 
can be crucial to a successful mediation.16 As neutral third parties, 
mediators use the ability to speak privately to the parties as a tool in 
facilitating settlement.17 Mediators attempt to identify the issues and 
uncover any underlying causes of conflict with the hope that they can 
use this information to encourage the parties to work out their dif-
ferences.18 Mediators will often use information obtained from their 
discussions to craft alternative grounds for settlement.19 During 
these discussions, it is inevitable that the participants will be called 
upon to discuss facts that they would not normally be willing to con-
cede. Confidentiality is essential to the mediation process; without it, 
parties would not be willing to make the kind of concessions and ad-
missions that lead to settlement.20 Therefore, confidentiality allows 
the parties to participate effectively and successfully.21  
 Confidentiality is also important to mediation as a measure to en-
sure that the proceeding is fair to the parties.22 Parties often commu-
nicate in mediations with the expectation that discussions are 
confidential.23 After informing the parties that the mediation is con-
fidential, mediators typically have all participants sign a confidenti-
                                                                                                                    
 14. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 4(b)(2) (2001).  
 15. Lawrence Freedman, Confidentiality: A Closer Look, in CONFIDENTIALITY IN 
MEDIATION: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 47, 49 (Anne Clare ed., 1985). 
 16. Lawrence R. Freedman & Michael L. Prigoff, Confidentiality in Mediation: The 
Need for Protection, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 37, 38 (1986).  
 17. Dillard, supra note 4, at 139-40.  
 18. Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 16, at 38. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Christopher DeMayo, The Mediation Privilege and Its Limits, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. 
REV. 383, 394 (2000). 
 21. Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 16, at 38. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. 
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ality agreement.24 Telling the parties that the mediation will be con-
fidential, however, does not necessarily create a judicially-recognized 
protection.25  
 Courts have often held that confidentiality agreements are unen-
forceable as a matter of public policy because “[a]greements between 
individuals are not permitted to restrict the court’s access to testi-
mony in its pursuit of justice.”26 Most participants in mediation, in-
cluding the mediator, are unaware of their duty to testify despite the 
fact that they have signed confidentiality agreements.27 This false 
sense of security leads to unintended disclosures that have drastic 
consequences.28 In the interest of fairness, parties should know be-
forehand what will be disclosed and what will remain confidential; 
notice allows parties to plan accordingly. 
 Confidentiality has significant effects on a mediator’s neutrality.29 
Ideally, a mediator should seek to create an atmosphere that encour-
ages an uninhibited flow of information from the participants to the 
mediator.30 Knowledge that the mediator might one day be an adver-
sary in court could prevent the participants from confiding during 
the mediation.31 This knowledge also hinders the mediator from 
building a rapport that is crucial to a successful mediation.32  
 Despite the importance of confidentiality to the mediation process, 
it is at odds with a judicial system that favors consideration of all 
relevant evidence.33 Most people recognize the need for some degree 
of confidentiality protection, but whether the scope should be broad 
or narrow has been the subject of much debate. Some people favor a 
narrow privilege, arguing that a broad privilege is unnecessary be-
cause of adequate confidentiality protection in existing statutes, con-
tractual agreements, and rules of evidence.34 It is further proposed 
that a broad privilege could severely hamper the rights of third par-
ties by preventing the use of relevant evidence.35  
                                                                                                                    
 24. Rufenacht, supra note 2, at 115.  
 25. Ehrhardt, supra note 6, at 92. 
 26. See Rufenacht, supra note 2, at 115 (citing Alan Kirtley, The Mediation Privilege’s 
Transition from Theory to Implementation: Designing a Mediation Privilege Standard to 
Protect Mediation Participants, the Process, and the Public Interest, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 
10-11). 
 27. Maureen A. Weston, Checks on Participant Conduct in Compulsory ADR: Recon-
ciling the Tension in the Need for Good-Faith Participation, Autonomy, and Confidentiality, 
76 IND. L.J. 591, 635 (2001). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 16, at 38. 
 30. Dillard, supra note 4, at 139.  
 31. Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 16, at 38. 
 32. Dillard, supra note 4, at 140. 
 33. Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 16, at 39. 
 34. See id. 
 35. Id. at 40.  
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 Those that favor a broad privilege find flaws in the argument that 
current law provides enough protection when considering that, in 
many cases, there is a false perception of confidentiality.36 A false 
perception of confidentiality can eventually cause the candor of par-
ticipants to be mitigated if expectation is not matched with reality; 
or, it can hurt the credibility of the mediation process in the eyes of 
the general public.37 Proponents also argue that confidentiality does 
not necessarily hamper litigation because it is likely that the infor-
mation being withheld would never have arisen absent the mediation 
and the perception of confidentiality.38 The UMA was drafted in the 
midst of this debate on the scope of confidentiality.39 
III.   THE UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT AND ITS APPROACH TO 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
 An ultimate goal of the UMA is to promote uniformity in an area 
of law that has varied greatly from state to state.40 To accomplish 
this, the drafters have sought to make the rules as predictable and 
simple as possible in the hope that it will encourage adoption of the 
Act.41 Confidentiality has become a major focus due to the many 
variations among the states. An important policy of the UMA is to 
ensure that the confidentiality protections of the Act are in line with 
the reasonable expectations of the parties.42 A focused set of rules has 
been drafted that participants can refer to when making decisions 
regarding what they want to disclose.43  
 The UMA has chosen to significantly expand confidentiality pro-
tections beyond what the majority of states currently allow.44 The 
drafters were fully aware that these rules make it more difficult to 
admit evidence in a subsequent judicial proceeding. However, they 
felt it was justified because the drafters viewed the “issue of confi-
dentiality” as an essential element “that will help increase the likeli-
hood that the mediation process will be fair.”45 “Fairness is enhanced 
if it will be conducted with integrity and the parties’ knowing consent 
                                                                                                                    
 36. Id. at 42. 
 37. Id. at 42-43. 
 38. Id. at 44. 
 39. Undoubtedly, this debate was also a central issue during the many revisions of 
the UMA that were necessary before a final version could be ratified. 
 40. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Prefatory Note pt. 3 (2001). 
 41. See id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Dillard, supra note 4, at 151. 
 44. 1 COLE ET AL., supra note 7, at § 8.1 app. A, B. 
 45. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Prefatory Note (2001). 
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will be preserved.”46 Many provisions in the UMA illustrate the 
drafters’ resolve to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.47 
 The UMA has given a broad definition of communication for pur-
poses of the Act.48 It includes “statements that are made orally, 
through conduct, or in writing or other recorded activity.”49 The pro-
tection provided is also similar to the attorney-client privilege protec-
tion in that a mediator’s mental impressions and observations and 
work product are considered communications for purposes of the 
privilege.50 
 The UMA has created a broad confidentiality privilege that ap-
plies to the participants and the mediator. “A mediation party may 
refuse to disclose, and may prevent any other person from disclosing, 
a mediation communication.”51 The mediator holds a limited privilege 
in that he or she can only prevent his or her own communications 
from being disclosed.52 The privilege is also extended to any other 
parties present at the mediation.53 This extended privilege has been 
the subject of widespread debate.54 
 The UMA has listed a number of specific statutory exceptions for 
which the privilege does not apply because of public policy reasons.55 
These exceptions include threats to commit bodily injuries or crimes 
of violence, communications used to plan or commit a crime, evidence 
of professional misconduct or malpractice, and evidence of abuse or 
neglect.56 Evidence of this type is automatically outside of the privi-
lege.57 The Act also lists some other exceptions that would be admis-
sible if deemed appropriate at an in-camera hearing.58 
 Section three, one of the most significant portions of the UMA, 
deals with scope of the Act.59 This section states that the Act applies 
to mediations that are ordered by the court,60 which is common. In 
addition, the Act applies to mediations in which the participants 
                                                                                                                    
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. § 2(2) (“‘Mediation communication’ means a statement, whether oral or in 
a record or verbal or nonverbal, that occurs during a mediation or is made for purposes of 
considering, conducting, participating in, initiating, continuing, or reconvening a media-
tion or retaining a mediator."). 
 49. Id. § 2(2), Reporter’s Notes. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. § 4(b)(1). 
 52. Id. § 4(b)(2). 
 53. Id. § 4(b)(3). 
 54. See detailed discussion infra Part IV. 
 55. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6 (2001). 
 56. Id. § 6(a). 
 57. Id. § 6, Reporter’s Notes. 
 58. Id. § 6(b). 
 59. Id. § 3. 
 60. Id. § 3(a)(1). 
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agree to mediate, and in any mediation conducted by a person who 
holds himself or herself out as a mediator.61 This effectively extends 
the confidentiality protection under the UMA to all presuit and vol-
untary mediations. This broad coverage is a departure from tradi-
tional state statutes that provide for enforceability of court-ordered 
mediation or mediation for particular types of disputes.62 Not only 
does section three extend the confidentiality privilege to all types of 
mediation, it also applies to administrative proceedings and other ar-
eas in which the Rules of Evidence do not apply.63 
 These provisions of the UMA reflect the drafters’ intent to pro-
mote candor through confidentiality.64 In addition to uniformity and 
confidentiality, the purpose of the UMA is to “encourage the policy of 
fostering prompt, economical, and amicable resolution of disputes in 
accordance with principles of integrity of the mediation process, ac-
tive party involvement, and informed self-determination by the par-
ties.”65 The drafters of the Act, along with the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, argue that the time is ripe to 
adopt a uniform law of mediation.66 States have now had the time to 
engage in experimentation with different approaches to mediation, 
and clear trends have emerged.67 Florida and every other state 
should at least evaluate the UMA to see if there are aspects of their 
current approach that can be improved. 
IV.   MEDIATION IN FLORIDA AND ITS APPROACH TO CONFIDENTIALITY 
 Florida has been at the forefront of the mediation movement as 
one of the first states to officially recognize the value of ADR in the 
legal system.68 Privileges in Florida are statutorily created, not de-
veloped by judicial decision.69 Florida utilizes the statutory system 
and the rules of civil procedure to both encourage and require man-
datory mediation. 
 Chapter 44, Florida Statutes, titled “Mediation Alternatives To 
Judicial Action,” is the most significant legislation pertaining to me-
diation. Florida defines mediation as “a process whereby a . . . 
                                                                                                                    
 61. Id. § 3(a)(2)-(3). 
 62. Id. § 3, Reporter’s Notes. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id., Prefatory Note. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id., Prefatory Note pt. 4. 
 67. Id. 
 68. SHARON PRESS, A SKILL-BUILDING FOR FAMILY LAW MEDIATORS/THE FLORIDA BAR 
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION COMMITTEE AND THE FAMILY LAW SECTION 1-1 (Florida 
Bar 2000) [hereinafter FAMILY LAW MEDIATORS]. 
 69. Perry S. Itkin, IN RE: Amendments to the Fl Rules for Certified and Court-
appointed Mediators—Revisions to the Fl Rules, in FAMILY LAW MEDIATORS, supra note 68, 
at 2-1. 
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mediator acts to encourage and facilitate the resolution of a dispute 
between two or more parties.”70  
 It further describes mediation as an informal and nonadversarial 
process, the goal of which is to help the parties reach a mutually ac-
ceptable and voluntary agreement.71 Unfortunately, the rules that 
stress a voluntary and nonadversarial process only pertain to court-
ordered mediation. Opposing sides have already been involved in 
litigation by the time the court orders mediation. Resolution of a dis-
pute is harder to achieve after litigation has begun and emotional 
feelings about a case have been influenced. Upon the request of one 
party to a civil action in Florida, the court is required to order both 
parties to attend mediation.72 There are a few stated exceptions to 
this rule such as medical malpractice, a landlord-tenant dispute, and 
a claim for a debt.73  
 The statute also provides a specific privilege of confidentiality to 
the participants in the mediation. This privilege states that “[e]ach 
party . . . has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent any per-
son present at the proceeding from disclosing, communications made 
during such proceeding.”74 However, confidential communications 
may be disclosed during disciplinary proceedings filed against media-
tors, although references to the privileged communications are de-
leted from the record prior to the release of any disciplinary files to 
the public.75 Ultimately, the statute grants wide discretion to the 
courts, providing that court-ordered mediation is conducted accord-
ing to the rules of practice and procedure adopted by the Florida Su-
preme Court.76  
 The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure also provide a statutory basis 
for mediation.77 The presiding judge in any civil matter has the 
authority to mandate mediation before trial.78 Judges may liberally 
use this discretion to settle disputes before trial in order to ease the 
burden of overcrowded courts.79 In addition, the rules also permit any 
party to move to disqualify a mediator for good cause, and provide 
guidelines for scheduling and completing the mediation.80 
                                                                                                                    
 70. FLA. STAT. § 44.1011(2) (2002). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. § 44.102(2)(a). 
 73. Id. §§ 44.102(2)(a)(1)-(8). 
 74. Id. § 44.102(3). 
 75. Id. § 44.102(4); see infra Part IV. 
 76. FLA. STAT. § 44.103(1) (2002). 
 77. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.700(a). 
 78. Id. 
 79. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Prefatory Note (2001). 
 80. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.700(a)-(d). 
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 The Florida Supreme Court has promulgated the Florida Rules for 
Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators.81 These rules govern me-
diator qualifications, standards of professional conduct, and disci-
pline. The rules state that the mediation proceedings are confidential 
and declare that a violation of confidentiality by a mediator could re-
sult in removal by the Chief Justice of the Florida Supreme Court.82 
However, this confidentiality only extends until sanctions are im-
posed, which suggests that the duty to remain confidential is inferior 
to a court order to testify at trial.83 Because Florida has adopted a 
specific set of rules that apply only to court-ordered mediation, the 
policies need to be re-examined in light of the growth of voluntary 
mediation in this country. 
V.   WHAT BENEFIT CAN FLORIDA GLEAN FROM  
THE UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT? 
A.   Comparison of the UMA to Florida’s Proposed Mediation Bill 
 The UMA is purported to be a culmination of the best mediation 
trends that have developed in the last thirty years.84 This has not 
gone unnoticed by lawmakers in Florida. The Florida Senate Judici-
ary Committee recently approved a “bill that would establish new 
confidentiality protections in pre-suit and voluntary . . . mediation.”85 
The bill, Senate Bill 1226, has also received the unanimous approval 
of the Senate Taxation and Finance Committee.86 “Sharon Press, di-
rector of the Florida Dispute Resolution Center, said the bill would 
‘create both a privilege and confidentiality protections’ that will be 
‘tried out in family mediations with the intent of extending [the pro-
tections] to all civil cases.’”87 The bill represents a response to the 
Uniform Mediation Act and has adopted some of the Act’s measures 
in regard to confidentiality.88 
 A major provision of the bill, relating to confidentiality in media-
tion, is the extension of coverage to voluntary and presuit mediation. 
Presuit mediation will entail any matters “which are in dispute and 
for which the persons disputing the matters agree to submit to me-
diation before the initiation of any legal proceeding.”89 This new ap-
                                                                                                                    
 81. FLA. R. MED. 10.020. 
 82. Id. 10.260. 
 83. See id. 
 84. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Prefatory Note pt. 4, 5 (2001). 
 85. Justin Kelly, Florida Senate Committee Passes Mediation Confidentiality Bill, 
ADRWorld.com (Mar. 1, 2002), at http://www.adrworld.com/opendocument.asp?Doc=WRl9 
SCJ19U&code=b8ne1tSm (last visited Mar. 30, 2003) (on file with author). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Fla. CS for SB 1226, § 10(g) (2002) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 44.1011(2)). 
496  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:487 
 
proach is effectively the same as the coverage adopted by the UMA 
and is a significant extension of Florida’s current law.  
B.   Why Florida’s Current Mediation Statutes are not Sufficient 
 Presently, all statutory coverage of mediation is limited to court-
ordered mediation.90 The statute does not cover presuit and volun-
tary mediation disputes, and they do not fall under the protection of 
the confidentiality privilege.91 Parties of a non-court-ordered media-
tion who desire to preserve the confidentiality of the process must 
rely on a signed confidentiality agreement.92 A contractual agreement 
does provide some measure of protection, but it pales in comparison 
to Florida’s statutory privilege, which approaches an absolute immu-
nity for participants.93  
 Extending protection to voluntary and presuit mediation will in-
crease the public’s faith in these areas of mediation. As discussed 
earlier, this faith in the process will make mediations more effective 
by promoting candor. Further, as public faith in the confidentiality of 
voluntary and presuit mediation increases, so should participation. 
An increase in participation coincides with Florida’s goal of expand-
ing mediation by encouraging its use on a voluntary basis.94  
 One of the principal goals of mediation, and ADR in general, is to 
promote resolution of disputes without having to resort to the judi-
cial process. This goal will be stifled if statutory protection is not 
provided for voluntary and presuit mediation. In today’s society, it is 
theoretically safer to file suit, thereby gaining the protection of the 
confidentiality privilege, before attempting to mediate. Adopting 
Senate Bill 1226 will allow parties to enter mediation and obtain the 
protection of the statute without ever entering the judicial system. In 
order to encourage parties to utilize mediation as an alternative to 
litigation, it makes sense to give people every incentive to avoid the 
judicial system.  
 Making confidential mediation more accessible to the public cre-
ates an attractive alternative to litigation. The proposed bill adopts 
another provision that appears to be taken directly from the UMA. 
Senate Bill 1226 creates specific exceptions to the confidentiality 
privilege for communications concerning abuse or neglect, evidence of 
acts or threats of violence, and professional misconduct committed 
                                                                                                                    
 90. FLA. STAT. § 44.102 (2002). 
 91. See id. 
 92. Itkin, supra note 69. 
 93. See Aaron J. Lodge, Legislation Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation: Armor of 
Steel or Eggshells?, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1093, 1107-08 (2001). 
 94. See Fla. CS for SB 1226, § 11 (2002) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 44.1012) (codifying the 
intent of the legislature to promote a range of alternative methods to resolve disputes in 
order to reduce the level of costly court intervention). 
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during the mediation.95 These exceptions are the same as the UMA’s 
automatic exceptions.96  
 Interestingly, there is one proposed addition to Florida’s media-
tion law that is not in the UMA and, in fact, was purposely left out of 
the Act.97 This section requests that the Florida Supreme Court es-
tablish a formal process by which settlement agreements may be 
filed and approved through a court order without requiring the par-
ties to appear in court.98 The purpose of this provision is to help ease 
the burden of overcrowded courts by eliminating the necessity of a 
court appearance. The process would “provide notice to the parties 
regarding their right to a hearing, include safeguards to prevent the 
filing or acceptance of agreements reached under duress or coercion, 
and provide for a hearing if the court determines that such a hearing 
is necessary.”99  
 The drafters of the UMA recommended against the judicial en-
forcement of mediation settlement agreements because of the possi-
bility that more sophisticated parties could use it to take advantage 
of others.100 However, the proposed provision offers some advantages. 
If parties attend presuit mediation, they can achieve judicial en-
forcement of a settlement agreement without ever having to go to 
court. In terms of time and money, the savings to the parties and the 
court can be substantial. Another section of the bill provides for the 
creation of a pilot program to test the proposed changes to the media-
tion law.101 These provisions offer enough potential advantages that 
the changes should at least be thoroughly tested. 
 Senate Bill 1226, also called the Family Court Reform Bill, repre-
sents Florida’s first attempt to incorporate portions of the UMA into 
Florida’s existing mediation law. Note that the portion of the bill re-
lating to mediation is but a small part of comprehensive legislation 
aimed at family court reform in general. Ultimately, even though the 
bill has not been successfully passed into law, the bill is noteworthy 
because it represents the current mindset of today’s Legislature and 
its view regarding mediation and the UMA.  
 Extension of the protection to cover voluntary and presuit media-
tion is a necessary step in light of the growth of mediation and the 
benefits mediation brings to our judicial system. A list of statutory 
exceptions is necessary for public policy reasons and to ensure a cer-
                                                                                                                    
 95. Id. § 12(3) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 44.1025). 
 96. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6 (2001). 
 97. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Management, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 
831, 903 n.419. 
 98. Fla. CS for SB 1226, § 14 (2002) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 44.1025). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Stipanowich, supra note 97. 
 101. Fla. CS for SB 1226, § 16 (2002) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 44.202). 
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tain amount of predictability. The bill provides some very important 
changes to Florida law based on the UMA. But it fails to address the 
UMA’s approach to the confidentiality privilege in general.  
C.   Differing Approaches to Privileges in Mediation 
 Two general variations exist in states that designate a statutory 
confidentiality privilege.102 Some states give a privilege to both the 
mediator and the participants, while others only extend the privilege 
to mediation participants.103 Florida follows the more narrow ap-
proach and limits the confidentiality privilege to the participants.104 
This grants a party to the mediation the right to refuse disclosure 
and prevent any other person present at the mediation from disclos-
ing communications made at the proceeding.105 If, however, the par-
ticipants waive the privilege or the court demands that the mediator 
testify, the individual will be forced to disclose everything that was 
discussed at the mediation, including his personal thoughts and work 
product.106  
 States that adopt a broad privilege extend its coverage to the par-
ticipants and the mediator.107 Similarly, under the UMA, the media-
tor has the authority to refuse to disclose the contents of the media-
tion, regardless of the parties’ or the court’s request, with some ex-
ceptions.108 The privilege also empowers the mediator with the right 
to block other parties from divulging the contents of the mediation 
unless all parties agree that a party should testify about a party’s 
mediation communications.109 Drafters could look to these prevailing 
models for guidance. 
 The underlying goals and principles of the UMA greatly influ-
enced the drafters’ decision when forming the UMA’s confidentiality 
privilege. As mentioned earlier, a primary goal of the UMA is to 
promote candor during mediation by sustaining the expectations of 
the parties and the mediator regarding the confidentiality of the me-
diation process.110 Parties are less likely to be sincere if there is a 
possibility, however remote, that what is said could later be used to 
their detriment in a judicial proceeding.111 Attorneys will point this 
out to clients and often advise against disclosing facts that may be 
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crucial to settlement.112 Further, the drafters felt that forcing a me-
diator to testify would erode public confidence in the mediation proc-
ess.113 In an attempt to accomplish both goals, the drafters combined 
the two approaches.  
 Under the UMA, the participants hold an absolute privilege that 
can be raised in regard to any communication made during the me-
diation.114 By contrast, the mediator holds a limited privilege. The 
limited privilege allows the mediator to decline to disclose a media-
tion communication; however, he or she can only prevent others from 
disclosing one of the mediator’s own communications.115 This 
privilege is much closer to a broad privilege than a narrow one, how-
ever, because mediators can withhold confidential communications 
and work product.116  
 Those who oppose a broad privilege believe it is unnecessary and 
argue that adequate protection for the parties already exists in the 
form of statutes and the Rules of Evidence.117 Critics argue that the 
UMA provides mediators “with more protections against testifying 
than are necessary.”118 In other confidential relationships, such as 
the attorney-client privilege, on which the UMA provision is based, 
“the privilege against testifying belongs to the part[ies] and can be 
waived.”119 Under the UMA, mediators have a separate privilege and 
can refuse any request to testify.120 However, “[i]f a mediator is ac-
cused of malpractice, he [or she can] waive [the] confidentiality 
[privilege] and testify in order to defend himself or herself.”121  
 In addition to being able to defend themselves, mediators can also 
force the mediation parties to testify.122 However, a party may not 
compel the mediator to testify when the party is seeking to overturn 
the settlement agreement.123 Further, there are certain situations in 
which mediation testimony should expressly be allowed.124 Testimony 
should be allowed in challenges to the mediation process.125 While 
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mediators strive to be completely impartial, there may be times when 
a mediator favors one side; a party should be allowed to challenge the 
process with the use of all relevant evidence if such a situation 
arises. Testimony should be allowed in claims that are not connected 
to the underlying mediation.126 By entering mediation, the parties 
should not be deemed to have waived their legal rights in another 
proceeding that they did “not contemplate[], [or] which may not have 
even existed, at the time of the mediation.”127 Testimony in other pro-
ceedings cannot be used against the parties, so allowing mediation 
communications should not affect the candor of the parties.  
 Adopting a narrow approach is more in line with the direction 
taken by the courts, which have favored a narrowing of existing 
privileges and have refused to recognize new ones.128 Leaving the 
privilege in the hands of the parties provides options to the partici-
pants in the actual dispute. If a compelling need for disclosure arises, 
the parties can waive their privilege or turn to the courts. The rights 
of participants will not be blocked by giving a privilege to a neutral 
third party. 
 Despite these arguments, the protection currently provided in 
Florida’s statutes and the Rules of Evidence is not enough. Florida 
has an absolute privilege for the participants, but it does not provide 
adequate protection for the confidentiality of the mediation process 
and should be expanded. In Florida, the mediator does not have a 
privilege, and a party is permitted to testify and subpoena the me-
diator’s testimony if the other party waives the privilege by alleging 
duress or intimidation.129 Further, courts have sometimes skirted 
narrowly construed privileges and required a mediator to testify 
against the parties’ wishes.130 This is problematic because confidenti-
ality and the appearance of impartiality are essential to the media-
tion process and these characteristics influence the public’s confi-
dence in mediation.131  
D.   Expectations of the Parties in Mediation 
 Public confidence in mediation will grow if people trust “that the 
mediator will not take sides or disclose their statements.”132 “The 
public confidence rationale has been extended to permit the mediator 
to object to testifying,” thereby allowing the mediator to remain neu-
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tral in future mediation sessions involving comparable parties.133 
This neutrality will dissipate if litigation forces a mediator into the 
position of a tie-breaking witness.134 Mediator testimony should be 
limited to circumstances in which there is a strong public policy in 
favor of disclosure,135 such as the specific exceptions in the UMA. 
 A broad privilege, such as the one adopted by the UMA, offers ad-
vantages that can enhance the overall success of the mediation proc-
ess in Florida. One of the UMA’s principal benefits is that it favors 
enforceable standards among the participants, the mediator, and 
third parties present at the mediation.136 Having a focused privilege 
such as this keeps the privilege in line with the reasonable expecta-
tions of the parties.137 Predictability is an important component of 
these expectations because it “is necessary for [the] parties to feel 
confident in using the mediation process.”138 
 Finally, Florida should adopt the mediator privilege to achieve the 
goal of state law uniformity. As previously mentioned, the myriad of 
different state laws regarding mediation has caused problems, par-
ticularly in today’s market of interstate commerce such as the Inter-
net. The law of the state in which the litigation is located usually de-
termines privileges,139 so it is possible for confidentiality to be deter-
mined by the law of a state other than the state in which a mediation 
takes place.140 This situation may potentially confuse mediation par-
ticipants and is not in line with the reasonable expectations of the 
parties. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 Florida’s approach to mediation has been remarkably successful 
since its inception in the early 1980s, particularly considering the 
few statutes available to provide guidance when the proposal was 
drafted. However, the recent adoption of the UMA should cause Flor-
ida to reconsider its current approach to mediation. Critics argue the 
old adage, “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it,”141 but Florida did not become 
a leader in the ADR movement by remaining content with the status 
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quo. Developments over the past thirty years have given states the 
chance to experiment with many different approaches to ADR, and 
clear trends have emerged.142 The UMA is a culmination of the best 
of these trends, and there are several provisions that Florida should 
adopt.  
 Whether through the Family Court Reform Bill or some future 
legislation, Florida should extend the confidentiality protection to 
cover voluntary and presuit mediation. This will encourage parties to 
use the mediation process without having to resort to the judicial 
system, and further Florida’s goal of expanding the use of ADR. Flor-
ida should also follow the UMA’s lead and adopt a limited mediator 
privilege. Adopting this privilege will increase the public’s confidence 
in the mediation process and foster its growth. This confidence will 
also make mediations more effective by encouraging candor among 
the participants. The UMA statutory exceptions are an indispensable 
companion to this heightened privilege that Florida should also 
adopt. In all, these measures coincide with Florida’s goal of increas-
ing the use and effectiveness of ADR. Florida has been a leader in 
mediation from the beginning of the movement. Implementing these 
portions of the UMA provide an opportunity for Florida to once again 
take a leadership role in crafting mediation in the future. 
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